A Plan

Objective Analysis I

[Ebal’s Plea, Twenty-three of thirty-two]

In the beginning I argued that the world’s authorities should proceed posthaste to excavate Mt. Ebal’s Joshua’s Altar.

This I concluded not necessarily because I find Stripling’s tablet claims emphatically true.

Instead, it is because the evidence sufficiently supports further excavation.

But by what measure did I arrive at that conclusion?

Largely it derives from a procedural rule of U. S. federal courts.

That is for summary judgment—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56–Title 28 of the U.S. Code.

How does summary judgment work? 

Consider an example.

Mark sues Sally in federal court for negligence involving a Louisiana car accident. Sally, a Michigan resident, asks the court for summary judgment. With her motion she attaches an affidavit stating that at the time of the wreck she was in Quebec.

By granting Sally’s motion a court could dismiss Mark’s case without him having the opportunity of a trial.

The U. S. Supreme Court recognized , however, that this litigation outcome raises due process issues. On the other hand, it also recognized that it must safeguard the trial process being overburdened by frivolous claims.

With Rule 56 the Supreme Court balances these competing interests. It authorizes the granting of Sally’s motion given these conditions:

• Sally proves that no genuine dispute exists regarding the facts relevant to her claim;
• The ruling court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Mark; and
• That court states on the record the reasons for its decision.

What does this have to do with our situation? This matter also requires a balancing of competing interest.

On one hand academics and scientists must maintain the trust of public, institutional and financial benefactors that their support is not wasted on frivolous pursuits.

On the other hand that interest must be balanced against the need to preserve potentially precious evidence.

Against the later Haughwout’s “refutation” has consequences. He claims to have proven that virtually no valuable evidence supports Striplings claims. This bolsters the idea that excavation holds little promise of yielding meaningful results. Resultantly, excavation is unlikely to proceed. Especially this is so given the adverse regional realities. This delay, as previously discussed (See Post 16, Troubled Waters, Local Perils), exposes Joshua’s Altar to potential harm that could lead to the loss of historical evidence of incalculable value.

A balance thus is necessary. It is on one hand between protecting support for legitimate academic and scientific pursuits. One the other it is against safeguarding historical evidence.

For this a measure similar to that of summary judgment I deem appropriate.

Accordingly I conclude that Haughwout as the one claiming the “refutation / disproval” should show that no genuine dispute exist regarding the issues relevant to his claim.

That would translate into him proving the following: That a reasonable person could not disagree with these statements:

• That the tablet does not contain proto-alphabetic script denoting the words “ARWR”–“cursed” and “YHW”–“Yahweh”, the Hebrew name for God; and
• That a Hebrew of before 1250 B. C, did not inscribed the tablet?

The next four posts consider these statements closely. Each respectively focus on:

• Does the tablet contains proto-alphabetic letters?;
• Does it display the word “ARWR”?;
• Does it reveal “YHW” as the name of God?; and
• Did a Hebrew of prior to 1250 B. C. inscribe it?

After those discussions, I give my written judgment on Haughwout’s “refutation”.

My conclusion of this memorandum follows that.

Let us get after it.

Next post: “Letters?”